<A>ABSTRACT
where technology plays an important role in facilitating both repression and transitions.
<B>Methodology
We sought to understand what the Tunisian process of revising Internet governance could tell us about the increasingly institutionalized implementation of the TJ framework. While we used the case of Tunisia to rethink TJ as a theoretical and empirical framework, we were not testing a hypothesis but rather exploring a question. We therefore situated the study within the pragmatic social sciences approach, using mixed methods to arrive at a conclusion. The primary framework was inductive and the purpose of the research exploratory, that is, we used the case study to reflect back on the existing theory and practice of TJ. A strong feature of this approach is a grounded methodology led by the concerns of practitioners working in the field, rather than by theoretical imperatives. The article draws together a deep engagement with the field of TJ, including both the academic literature and the practice associated with organizations such as the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ),
 qualitative critical discourse analysis and qualitative, semi-structured interviews carried out in Tunisia.
By grounding this reflection on TJ as an academic theory and as a body of practice in the experience of Tunisians negotiating the transformation of Internet governance, the article allows a better understanding of how TJ can meet the challenges it faces. This case study was chosen because Tunisia has frequently been cited as current best practice for current TJ work.  It is a process that has had five years to mature, giving some opportunity for TJ mechanisms to take shape.
At the time of research, Tunisia was the only case in the early enough stages for us to understand 12 Christalla Yakinthou was the country manager of ICTJ's Cyprus office, and has also managed components of ICTJ's Lebanon programming as well as consulting on other transitional justice programming both for ICTJ and other initiatives. 13 Luca Urech, 'Challenging History: The Power of Transitional Justice in Tunisia,' Al Nakhlah, 10 June 2014; David Tolbert, '"Tunisian Spring" Continues, But Challenges Remain,' World Post, 7 September 2014; Ali Anouzla, 'Tunisia's Transition, ' New Arab, 6 November 2014. how perceptions of TJ and its importance to reform are developing in civil society and government structures during an active transition, and how an administrative body which has reformed understands itself in relation to TJ processes.
Over two weeks in March and April 2013, a crucial period in which the TJ process was still very much under way, 15 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were carried out with activists and policy makers in Tunisia. These interviews were targeted at building a complex picture of different perspectives on the TJ process, and on Internet governance in the post-revolution period.
Interviewees included people who took part in implementing censorship and surveillance under the Ben Ali regime, Internet freedoms activists, members of TJ-specific Tunisian and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and policy makers within the current Tunisian government.
This range of participants allowed us to understand the TJ process both from within and from the perspective of outsiders who were more involved in reconstructing Internet governance and who did not see their work as part of the TJ process. A purposive sampling strategy was used for those involved in the TJ process, and Christalla Yakinthou's access to the TJ community was used to draw up initial interviewee lists. Some informants, however, were part of hidden populations and so we also made use of snowball sampling methods. Two sets of interview guides were developed, one for TJrelated actors and another for Internet governance and social media activists. In each case, some questions were adapted to the expertise of the informant. Key questions about the TJ process, how interviewees came to know about TJ and its relation to Internet governance remained through every interview, as a means of seeking consistent themes.
All interviewees were offered the option of anonymous participation and in cases where this was preferred, further attempts were made to ensure that participants are not identifiable through details of their employment or lives. However, some participants, particularly activists, had compelling reasons to prefer being identified by name or by a well-known pseudonym. If we are to take seriously the injunctions to treat activists as experts in their own right, and co-producers of knowledge,  we also must acknowledge that at times activists will value the visibility and acknowledgement of their work that comes with real-name or pseudonymous participation. Activists' decisions to seek visibility for their work is also, at times, informed by the potential protection afforded by international attention, as seen in the efforts to free Egyptian blogger Alaa Abd El-Fatah.  A commitment to ethical research processes and respect for participants' knowledge and autonomy must include leaving room for participants' informed decisions to balance potential harms and benefits of anonymity.

This research has obvious limitations. First, it is a single case study with an individual organization as the primary unit of analysis. Ideally, the findings of this research should be tested against other case studies in a larger comparative study across longer time periods. Second, we acknowledge that as an exploratory work that expands the discussion of TJ to a new area, we have limited space for deep theoretical reflection. We focus, rather, on drawing together empirical material to highlight innovations to the TJ framework that would benefit from more comprehensive elaboration in future publications.
<B>Outline
The next section sets out our case study, outlining the TJ framework in Tunisia and information controls (including Internet censorship and surveillance) in the country under Ben Ali. The ways in which the legacy of information controls (and therefore also Internet reform processes) overlaps with broader TJ concerns, in Tunisia and elsewhere, is then highlighted. The final section holds a deeper analysis of our findings, including the ways activists and institutional actors in Tunisia have addressed national and international legacies of information controls and attempted to build new structures for Internet reform. The conclusion focuses on how these findings might translate into broader contributions to the discussion of three key criticisms of the TJ framework: that it is inflexible and does not respond effectively to new experiences and needs; that more attention must be paid to structural inequalities between TJ practitioners/experts and local communities; and that it fails to address international complicity in human rights abuses.
<A>THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TJ FRAMEWORK
Transitional justice is a field that has emerged over the last roughly three decades of human rights practice. Over the first decade of its development, there was no uniform approach to addressing legacies of state-sanctioned violence. Transitional justice can be defined as a series of judicial and nonjudicial efforts to overcome legacies of significant human rights abuses. Though it is rooted in principles including the rights to truth, justice and nonrepetition, at its most conservative it is articulated, especially by the ICTJ and the UN, as a collection of 'mechanisms' to address these legacies. These centre on criminal prosecutions, 17 Arthur, supra n 2. truth commissions, reparations programmes and institutional reforms.
 While there are a number of interpretations of TJ that challenge this framing,  they will be discussed later. We use this particular understanding here because it is these actors that are setting agendas and guiding TJ programming in Tunisia.
Internet governance is not considered part of the TJ framework. Academic and policy analysis of TJ barely mentions the Internet, and certainly does not provide in-depth examination of the place of Internet governance within the TJ framework. This is not surprising given that the framework's development preceded widespread use of the Internet.
However, the literature and practice of TJ does touch on key issues related to Internet governance. For example, the TJ literature addresses the need to allow avenues for citizens to make their concerns heard and to question authority,  to balance lustration law with the right to political expression  and more generally to build a robust democracy and an engaged citizenry, which is assumed to include a healthy media environment as a 'fourth pillar' of democracy.  While some authors and practitioners are addressing the role of the Internet in democratic reconstruction,  this is not happening within the TJ framework.
<B>The Tunisian TJ Landscape and Emerging Critiques
Although the Tunisian transition has been the face of the new generation of TJ and of the Middle East 66-86. 24 Breuer and Groshek, supra n 3.Internet for and against reform. While the country is moving towards implementing a new constitution it also, in November 2014, elected a president with strong links to the old regime. This may change the landscape of the transition and has implications for TJ efforts.
 At the same time, two 2015 terrorist attacks purportedly by Daesh affiliates have negatively impacted laws around a number of civil rights for citizens.  There is a perception that the government is quietly undermining freedom of expression laws, and that there is a return of censorship and surveillance through agencies that have no independent oversight. There are also concerns about the lack of real reform in the security sector and judiciary, and ongoing police violence.

While all this happens, a wide variety of actors previously excluded from political processes are starting to be involved in them, as well as in reform efforts. In this tense climate, the revolution's vanguard and watchdog has been and continues to be civil society and Internet activists, including critical voices linked to independent media online. This makes the nexus between Internet reform, via the work of the ATI, and TJ mechanisms important to watch. Where mainstream media is largely silent and owned by a shrinking group of key political actors, bloggers have continuously forced issues into public consciousness.  It is fitting, then, that the one area that underwent constant and agendas. With the involvement of key international TJ actors (particularly the ICTJ and the UN Development Program), a technical commission was also formed to manage the national debate on TJ, producing the draft TJ law.
While this second phase demonstrated local institutions' remarkable capacity and willingness to begin working on TJ processes, it also highlighted some of the issues surrounding the framework, including the overwhelming pressure to develop TJ institutions quickly at the expense of building deep and broad public platforms for discussion, which takes time; the exclusion of certain voices; and the need to provide space for people to shape their own visions of TJ, instead of boxing public voices into preexisting strategies. On the other hand, this process was useful in building a common language and framework around which visions of the future can be modelled. This also affects the context within which sideline reform efforts like the ATI's have been shaped. From our primary data, it appears that interplay exists between the articulation of reform in Tunisia as laid out so comprehensively by the TJ landscape, and efforts with aligned goals that are outside the official TJ framework.
Our interviewees' critiques of the Ministry and dominant approaches to TJ in Tunisia speak to broader concerns around the balance between creating an organic process which is at least in part responsive to specific citizens' needs, and implementing core TJ mechanisms that address global principles of reform and the attainment of justice. An interviewee articulated this tension:
If you see any debate on transitional justice it's … very much focused on procedure. What I see happening is you have this top-down framework that is taking much space, public space, but there are small processes on the side, which are not recognized as transitional justice processes, because they don't fit into this global framework. So you have, I hear it in the regions I visit, very nice debates on, for example on ending discrimination against certain groups. I mean these debates would fit under transitional justice but they're not part of this national discussion because they're happening locally,
36
Personal interview, employee of international organization, Tunis, Tunisia, Februrary 2013. 37 Nassar, supra n 2 at 73. because these people don't have access to this machinery of transitional justice that the government has set up.

We argue that the introspection, reform and reframing of the ATI as a defender of civil liberties may well be one of those 'small processes on the side' that carry significant local innovation. Examination of this particular sideline process illuminates the importance of an area that is of increasing relevance to the issues around reconciliation and rebuilding trust, which are central TJ concerns. It also offers broader lessons about how the increasingly formalized TJ process might be rethought to better meet local needs.
<B>Internet Governance in Tunisia
In contrast with the recognized TJ processes, we use the informal process surrounding Internet reform in Tunisia -focusing on the ATI's role -to underline some of the criticisms and weaknesses outlined in the literature. While Internet governance may not be considered part of the TJ framework, in this case it both echoes and grapples with many of the field's concerns. To understand this, it is useful to briefly review the country's history of Internet censorship and surveillance, which we refer to the costs and difficulty of dismantling its legacy, should make it clear that Internet governance is an ongoing issue which -like so many aspects of TJ -extends beyond Tunisia's borders, has complicated questions around international responsibility and complicity and has a longer temporal framework than may immediately be recognized. In this respect, while the ATI's efforts to grapple with international complicity in the regime's information controls do not offer a complete solution, they do point to some areas that need to be addressed.
It is important to connect this to the lived experiences of activists and others targeted by censorship and surveillance. Attacks on email were one of the most notable examples of this, and after 2003 'interior ministry operators went through emails, sometimes dropped or modified the contents and then 42 Ibid., 489. 43 Vernon Silver, 'Post-Revolt Tunisia Can Alter E-Mail with "Big Brother" Software, ' Bloomberg, 12 December 2011. forwarded emails, often hours later to their intended recipients.'  This aspect of the regime also impacted people who weren't involved in politics but whose email included content critical of the government, as Vernon Silver's investigative work in 2011 showed.  The ability of the surveillance apparatus to modify, as well as read and censor, emails had particularly chilling effects. While on occasion email content would be replaced by garbled symbols or advertising, at times it also included messages such as 'you can run but you can't hide,' pornographic material or inappropriate sexual or threatening content.
The moment of jubilation that accompanied the end of Ben Ali's information control regime has been followed by recognition that significant work is still required to deal with its after effects, and to build an alternative system of Internet governance (not to mention restricting surveillance of mobile and other communications). As well as dealing with the distrust created by years of information controls, the ATI remains in possession of many of the machines used by the regime, and has borne the financial costs of the final periods of contracts with providers of censorship and surveillance way to the people, they have to open all those archives, and they're really huge.

The opening of archives was positioned by Chakchouk as part of the ATI's debt to Tunisian society, but one that needed active assistance from civil society to happen. At the same time, Slim Amamou argued that the key issue that needs attention is the decision-making process, rather than decrypting the technology or opening archives. Amamou's comment is particularly important given that questions still remain about information control chains of command and the relationships between the Interior Ministry, the police and judiciary and the ATI. A clear aim of truth seeking and institutional reform is to bring to light exactly these kinds of relationships and to implement change that blocks reversion to such structures of control.
One outcome of the ATI's 'public legacy' thinking is the creation of the 404 Lab -the transformation of the former surveillance headquarters' basement, where the regime kept its surveillance hardware, into a dual memorial/educative site. The 404 Lab was launched in June 2013 as an open innovation space, designed in collaboration with civil society and hacktivists.

In engaging with aspects of its legacy by championing a free Internet, creating an open public space on the site of former surveillance headquarters, encouraging discussions by regime staff with media about how the system worked, working with civil society to push for the opening of ATI archives, setting up global legacy projects for other less-open societies, and thinking through the balance of individual and collective accountability, the ATI can be said to be leading its own form of truth-seeking discussion about violations committed through its agency, attempting to provide accountability for its role in the dictatorship's machinery and engaging in efforts at restitution.
Essentially, these efforts can be seen within the framework of a commitment to address its role in the legacy of state-led violence and repression against Tunisian citizens. This is not to say, however, that the ATI's role has been entirely unproblematic. One interviewee, A second important area of learning relates to inconsistencies within the TJ framework, including the lack of internal cohesion of its goals, the extent to which its agendas are set by international rather than local actors, and the pursuit of core mechanisms which represent certain global legal principles that may impede or suffocate locally defined efforts to come to terms with legacies of conflict.  This last area is particularly contested because TJ as a field has been built upon the pursuit of these legal principles, which themselves come out of human rights frameworks.  Critic-practitioners like of which experiences to include and exclude depends on whose definition is taken as legitimate by those actors implementing and funding TJ efforts. This point was raised by both ATI practitioners and interviewees.
A final relevant criticism of TJ's deep institutionalization relates to its consequent hesitation around comprehensively addressing issues of international complicity, including the complicity of governments and private companies in human rights abuses.  As we have highlighted, the Tunisian experience of TJ, cast against the silence around the role of private companies supplying the regime with surveillance technology, speaks directly to this 'elephant in the room.'
Simon Robins and Paul Gready argue that the cooption of TJ approaches into prescribed and legalistic processes has significant limitations, and prefer to refocus on a newer, broader concept termed 'transformative justice.'  This resonates with the Tunisian context, where much of the rebuilding process is taking place with reference to existing TJ narratives and practices. The current TJ framework and institutions' rigidness are highlighted by TJ's failure to even glancingly address the current TJ process and discussion of the ATI's work show that the course of TJ is not linearespecially not in a context like Tunisia, where the dictatorship's end has exposed deep economic, political and religious tensions. This article used the example of Internet governance reform in Tunisia to challenge the idea that a TJ path should consist of a set of well-formulated mechanisms representing the primary pillars of a TJ programme. Instead, it showed that there are other ways of addressing legacies of widespread human rights violations that are doing equally well, and that combine an outlook informed by TJ discourse with local processes in order to grapple with the larger questions of accountability, memory, truth and reform.
The ATI's work to deal with its legacy, and indeed to shift the broader Internet reform process in Tunisia, holds lessons for TJ. It certainly speaks to three significant criticisms of the field: the first, and broadest, is that the TJ framework is inflexible and is not incorporating new experiences and needs.
Our interviews and the literature have shown that the ATI's reforms are not on the radar of TJ practitioners either in-country or internationally, but its work began early and has tackled all the key elements that underpin TJ concerns. It has engaged with its legacy of repression by championing a free Internet; establishing a kind of global restitution by setting up legacy projects for other less-open societies and sharing its knowledge and transition with some of its neighbour states grappling with similar issues; creating its own version of a 'memorial space,' a public site of learning on the grounds of the former surveillance headquarters; encouraging public and media discussions by regime staff about how the system worked; and showing evidence of attempts to balance individual and collective accountability while also trying to push debates on international complicity and the protection of freedom of speech and information.
It can be argued that this work is particularly important for us to learn from because, as our interviews have shown, there are already important voices within Tunisia signalling that some perspectives are being closed out or ignored by a TJ machine that seeks to 'translate or try to translate what these people say into their own [the international community's/practitioners'] legalistic language.'  It is telling that the ATI has managed its transformation while operating in a context that is clearly informed by, but not linked deeply into, the country's TJ landscape; perhaps being left to its own devices was a key to its apparent success.
This case study contributes in three main ways to the broader work around accusations of inflexibility and marginalization of particular voices. First, it is an example of innovative thinking that addresses the underlying norms but that does not fit within the prescription or the areas of attention given to TJ reforms. In addition, internet reform and governance is likely to become an area of increasing importance for TJ over the coming decade, both because of the Internet's growing role in citizen engagement and because it grapples with how to deal with structures of the legacy of surveillance and censorship.
The second criticism addressed relates to the ways in which the ATI's work speaks to the structural inequalities between TJ practitioners and experts and local communities, and questions around the extent to which TJ programming truly empowers or disempowers local communities and victims. The ATI's attempts at Internet governance and reform undertaken post-revolution could be considered an unorthodox case study, undertaken by local actors outside the formal TJ context but unavoidably infused by the broader context of seeking to engage with legacies of repression. This is perhaps an ideal relationship between awareness of a broader culture, goals and lexicon of dealing with the past, but teamed with the autonomy to create change in a way that is internally meaningful and relevant.
The third criticism addressed relates to TJ's failure to more honestly consider international complicity in human rights abuses. While the principle of universal jurisdiction has taken us some way towards global accountability, less has been done on international accountability for governments and the private sector. In this respect, naming companies and countries which offered technology and support to Ben Ali's surveillance architecture has opened a space for discussion around an issue continuously ignored, perhaps primarily because donor governments to TJ programming are often 74 Personal interview, employee of international organization, Tunis,Tunisia, April 2013.
